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Sharon Beder 
Globalisation: Before and After the Crisis
Rise of Globalisation
So-called »free« markets are becoming the new organising principle for the 
global order. The idea that governments should protect citizens against the 
excesses of free enterprise has been replaced with the idea that government 
should protect business activities against the excesses of democratic regu-
lation. What business leaders seek, and to a large extent have achieved, are 
»business-managed democracies«, that is, democracies where the politics and 
cultural life of nations are managed in the interests of business.
Corporations have always had a certain amount of power through their abi-
lity to make decisions concerning production and employment. And as they 
have grown in size and number that economic power has become signifi cant 
and has been used to exert political infl uence. However, corporations have 
not been content with the degree of economic power and political infl uence 
they can wield individually. Since the mid-20th Century they have sought to 
increase their collective power, consolidating their political infl uence to pres-
sure governments to make decisions in favour of business interests. And since 
the 1970s corporate coalitions have moved from defending their economic 
freedom from the demands and interventions of labour unions and govern-
ments, to being far more aggressive in their goals, extending them from just 
determining economic policy to social policy as well. Their takeover of key 
areas of government policy making and service provision has meant that as 
time goes by democratic power is undermined and thwarted (Beder 2006a). 
The political mobilization of business interests since the 1970s meant that 
corporations began to act as a class with a shared ideology rather than a coll-
ection of competing companies with some common business interests. The 
class consciousness of top corporate executives was facilitated by the grow-
th of inter-corporate networks of ownership and interlocking directorates of 
large corporations, which gave rise to a growing number of corporate exe-
cutives who occupied positions on the boards of several companies. These 
corporate executives became politically active on behalf of business in gene-
ral. They provided the leadership for business coalitions and associations and 
were employed at the top levels of the largest corporations (Useem 1984, 5). 
19
Globalisation: Before and After the Crisis
Many of these coalitions are now global in their reach refl ecting the transna-
tional nature of the modern corporation. The corporate class has evolved into 
a transnational capitalist class (Sklair 2000).
A great number of business coalitions have been formed for this purpose 
of presenting a combined and powerful voice for business. These coalitions 
are tightly networked and closely interrelated through their common cor-
porate membership. This multiplicity of coalitions with heavily overlapping 
membership and leadership enables corporations to multiply their power and 
infl uence.
The »unprecedented levels of strategic alliances and global networks« crea-
ted by transnational corporations (TNCs) have been referred to as a new form 
of capitalism: »alliance capitalism«. In this new form of capitalism, TNCs 
have more in common with, and show more loyalty to, TNCs from around 
the world than with the countries where they are headquartered (Sklair 2002, 
65). Despite this shift in allegiance, national governments still go out of their 
way to facilitate the business activities of these TNCs and to ensure govern-
ment social policies do not unduly impede those activities.
The rise of corporate power since the 1980s and the increasing importance 
accorded to markets mean that transnational corporations are eclipsing the 
nation state as the driving force behind policy-making. The corporate goal of 
free trade and investment has been given precedence over other citizen goals 
such as environmental protection, improved working conditions, affordable 
and accessible electricity and water, universal health care and schooling. Each 
of these areas of social policy has been subject to commodifi ation, marketisa-
tion, privatisation and deregulation in the name of free markets.
Business coalitions have sought to expand markets through the exercise of 
business-managed democracy. They have mobilised and lobbied to get govern-
ments to sign up to trade agreements. These agreements are portrayed as being 
about economic trade but are really about ensuring that the social and environ-
mental policy and regulation of nation states does not interfere with the ability 
of TNCs to invest, trade and sell their services anywhere in the world. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the organization that ensures that 
trade rules prioritise business interests over national and public interests. It 
has greater powers than any other international institution including powers 
to punish non-complying nations that are not even available to the United 
Nations. Over 130 nations are now members of the WTO. It has become a 
form of global government in its own right with judicial, legislative and exe-
cutive powers. (Braithwaite/Drahos 2000, 177; Clarke c. 1999, 4-5)
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The enlistment of regulators, bureaucrats and politicians in their cause has 
been a key achievement of those lobbying for various agreements within the 
WTO. This is made easier by the phenomenon of the revolving door. Large 
corporations are able to offer lucrative positions, including directorships, to 
those who are supportive of their aims.
Neoliberalism
From the second world war until the 1980s most OECD governments had 
a mixed economy whereby essential services remained in government con-
trol and governments sought to provide social welfare for the disadvantaged. 
They subscribed to Keynesian economic theory which promoted government 
spending as a way of keeping market demand high enough to ensure high 
levels of employment, and therefore high levels of income and spending. In 
this way they sought to avoid the downward spiral into depression that had 
occurred in the 1930s. Budget defi cits and surpluses were used to regulate 
economic activity and manage the economy. Governments therefore had a 
strong social and economic role which they sometimes used to achieve grea-
ter equity through progressive taxation and the free provision of welfare and 
social services, such as health and education.
Keynesian economics suffered a pronounced decline in popularity during 
the 1970s when economic growth in affl uent countries slowed as oil prices 
escalated following the oil crisis. Stagfl ation, the combination of low econo-
mic growth and infl ation, contradicted Keynesian theories, which seemed 
to offer no solution to the problem. Opponents argued that the welfare state 
was the problem because social security, and the high taxation it required, 
degraded the incentives to work hard and take business risks. Businesspeople 
feared that the rising government defi cits would cause interest rates to go 
up, making private investment more expensive and adding to infl ation. At 
the same time free market advocates disparaged the benefi ts of government 
intervention and planning through spurious reference to the failures of the 
planned economies of the Soviet Union and other communist nations (Carroll 
1992, 8; Easton/Gerritsen 1996, 28; Jackson/Price 1994, 3). 
It was at this time that a fundamentalist combination of neoclassical theo-
ries and economic liberalism, which came to be referred to as neoliberalism, 
came to the fore, particularly in English speaking nations. Neoliberalism ad-
vocated the replacement of government functions and services with those 
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provided by private profi t-seeking fi rms operating in the market (privatiza-
tion); deregulation of labour and fi nancial markets; deregulation of business 
activities; free trade; and smaller government through reduced taxes, spen-
ding and regulation. These policies were promoted in the name of free mar-
kets, economic growth and the public interest (Beder 2006b, ch. 4). 
For many years neoliberal economic theories had been considered margi-
nal and obsolete. They moved from the margins of economic thought to the 
centre of orthodoxy because they became useful to business interests seeking 
to minimize government interference in their activities and expand markets. 
Neoliberal theories were embraced by big business because they provided a 
legitimation for their pursuit of self-interest and avenues for business expan-
sion (Beder 2006a, 151). They supported the argument that government re-
gulation interfered with business and undermined »enterprise culture« (Self 
1993, 72). In this view government intervention in the management of the 
economy is unnecessary and unwise because the market is a self-correcting 
mechanism. There was also some appeal in free market ideology for govern-
ments in that it absolved them of responsibility for economic performance 
(Beder 2006a, 8). 
In English speaking nations an array of corporate-funded think tanks pro-
liferated during the 1980s and 90s, which successfully promoted neoliberal 
policies. For example the rise of Thatcherism in Britain can be attributed in 
large part to the endeavours of two think tanks: the Institute of Economic Af-
fairs (IEA) and the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS). In the US too, conservative 
corporate-funded think tanks have been responsible for the transmission and 
promotion of free market ideas and policies since the rise of Reagan in the 
1980s (Beder 2006a, ch. 1). 
Neoliberal policies were also the basis for the Washington Consensus which 
was forced on developing nations at an international level by the World Bank 
and the IMF through the use of loan conditions and structural adjustment 
packages. The Consensus gave economic goals priority over social goals, de-
stroying socially benefi cial traditions and desirable aspects of cultures in the 
process (Stilwell 1993, 36). Progressive taxation systems were dismantled 
and government social services decimated. 
Whilst the IMF and the World Bank enforced the Washington Consensus 
on poorer countries in desperate need of capital, other more affl uent countries 
were forced into adopting the same formula by the world’s fi nancial markets. 
Their vulnerability to these markets was facilitated by fi nancial deregulation. 
Financial deregulation involved three actions: the opening up of a nation 
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to the free fl ow of capital in and out of it; the removal of regulations on fi -
nancial institutions operating within a country; and the removal of political 
controls from the central bank (Patnaik 1999). In this way the fi nancial sector 
of many nations became part of the international fi nancial sector serving the 
interests of global fi nancial institutions rather than the interests of the local 
people or national governments (Beder 2006b, 47-52). 
Financial deregulation was demanded by business interests, particularly 
large fi nancial fi rms and transnational corporations that wanted to be free to 
move their money around. As a result of fi nancial deregulation governments 
become accountable to international fi nancial markets and »the markets have 
become the police, judge and jury of the world economy (Financial Times 
1994). 
However, the judgement of fi nancial markets is neither wise nor well 
thought out. Rather it is greed/panic-driven and herd-like. Decisions to buy 
and sell are not made on the basis of what is good for a nation’s economy 
but rather on the basis of trying to second guess other investors. This mere-
ly serves to create economic instability and does little to foster productive 
long-term investment. Investment capital that could otherwise be used in 
production is used for gambling on the economies of various countries (Bel-
lo 2008).
Financial deregulation exposes »the economy to the vortex of specula-
tive capital movements, that is, to the fl ows of short-term fi nance in search 
of quick profi ts.« For example, only ten percent of transactions in currency 
markets represent actual trade. The rest is largely speculative (Patnaik 1999; 
Toussaint, 1998, 52). The rapid infl ow and outfl ow of speculative fi nance can 
cause crises in national economies (Patnaik 1999). 
Countries can still retain a veneer of democracy with choice between major 
parties, but because of the constraints imposed by the need to please inter-
national fi nancial markets, the policy differences between the major parties 
is minimal. They all adopt the same free market policies (Patnaik 1999). Go-
vernments that try to deviate are punished by the markets, in particular, »the 
major international banks, large transnational corporations with major fi nan-
cial dealing, fund managers within key private fi nancial institutions, and the 
key credit-ratings agencies (such as Moody’s)« (Bell 1997, 105).
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Inequality and Debt
As neoliberal policies were implemented around the world disparities in wealth 
and income increased and poverty increased, contradicting neoliberal theories 
that by increasing the wealth at the top everyone would be better off.
The Washington Consensus benefi ted transnational corporations and large 
companies, often at the expense of small local businesses, and always at the 
expense of the poor (Beder 2006b, 46). Between 1980 and 2000 incomes in 
Africa declined by 23 percent and the Latin American economies only grew 
by 6 percent (Palast 2002, 48). Forty four percent of people in developing na-
tions live in poverty and unemployment doubled in the last decade of the 20th 
Century (Financial Times 2002, 1; New York Times 2002, A-1; Washington 
Post, 2002, E01). Even the IMF admits that »in recent decades, nearly one-
fi fth of the world population have regressed« (Quoted in Palast 2002, 50). 
In the US, »[t]hree decades of neoliberal economic policy has led to the 
widest gap between rich and poor in America as compared to other industria-
lized nations…Currently the top 20% of population in America receive about 
50% of income, while the lowest 20% get merely 3.4% of the income, and 
the top 1% own 40% of the wealth.« (Torbat 2008) Although average wages 
increased by 2.5 percent between 2000 and 2007 this increase actually oc-
curred at the top of the wage hierarchy with Wall Street traders and executives 
earning many billions of dollars each year between 2003 and 2007 (Muzaffar 
2008; Time 2008), while the real wage of the median household fell over 
that time (Sapir 2008). Such disparities in income have been accepted becau-
se greed has been institutionalised and legitimised as a driver of free market 
economies: »The rapacious acquisition and accumulation of wealth by an 
elite is sanctifi ed as a vital pre-requisite for the progress and prosperity of the 
people. The poor, it is argued, will eventually benefi t from the wealth created 
by the elite.« (Muzaffar 2008)
Inequities in income in many countries, resulting from neoliberal policies, 
meant that consumer demand could not keep up with production capacity. 
Consequently profi ts from investing in production declined and economic 
growth slowed. Once governments would have fed demand through govern-
ment spending, but neoliberalism precluded this. Instead consumer demand 
was increased through bank credit to consumers (Torbat 2008). This tem-
porarily ensured continued economic growth in many countries. In the US, 




Consumer credit was augmented by mortgage debt. The middle-classes in 
the US, for example, borrowed money through home mortgages, to pay for 
consumer items and to be able to invest in the booming stockmarket (Sapir 
2008). More and more people were given these loans despite declining wa-
ges, because rising house prices seemed to guarantee that the loan institutions 
could not lose. If people defaulted on their mortgages the repossession of their 
homes would cover their debt. »By 2004, Americans were using home equity 
to fi nance as much $310 billion a year in personal consumption.« (Gupta 
2008) By 2008 household debt was up to 93 per cent of US GDP (Sapir 2008), 
and was a key driver of economic growth in the US (Gupta 2008).
Low interest rates meant more home buyers could afford to buy homes and 
more of them could afford more expensive homes so that house prices went 
up. »Big ticket mortgages were aggressively sold to millions who could not 
normally afford them by offering low »teaser« interest rates that would later 
be readjusted to jack up payments from the new homeowners.« (Bello 2008) 
The demand for housing as an investment, caused house prices to increase 
even more. This demand increased after the stock market declines in 2000 
and 2001 when nervous investors moved from the stock market to property 
as a safer investment (Gupta 2008). 
Causes of the Financial Crisis
As a result of neoliberal policies, wealth accumulated in the hands of the few 
who searched for ways to invest it that were more profi table than investment 
in production. The fi nancial sector offered lucrative investment opportunities, 
exacerbating the volatility of markets that accompanies »massive speculation« 
(Muzaffar 2008). 
The neoliberal opposition to government intervention in business and mar-
kets, and in particular the deregulation of fi nancial institutions, allowed fi nan-
cial markets to become more and more complex as traders worked out more 
and more ways to make money from both rising and falling markets, using de-
rivatives, credit default swaps, and other mechanisms that were often beyond 
the understanding of the layperson and many politicians (Bello 2008).
One investment mechanism was »collateralized debt obligations« (CDO’s), 
which turned home mortgages into a tradeable commodity. Banks could earn 
fees from setting up mortgages and then sell on the mortgage so as to free up 
their money to establish more mortgages. Once the mortgage was sold on, 
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the bank did not have to worry about whether the mortgage would be paid 
off and so it was less concerned about ability to pay when it approved loans. 
»Banks began using call centers and high-pressure tactics to mass-produce 
mortgages because the profi t was in volume – how many loans could be ap-
proved how fast.« (Gupta 2008)
To make these mortgages attractive to investors, the banks had them as-
sured by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, which to investors was as good as a 
government guarantee for the mortgages since they were sure the US govern-
ment would not allow these institutions to go bankrupt. Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, banks and hedge funds bundled mortgages together as mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) to sell them to investors who would then own the right to 
receive mortgage payments (Gupta 2008).
MBSs were further bundled with other investment products into CDO’s. The 
various middle-people who were involved in selling them on had an interest 
in understating the risks associated with these CDOs and because fi nancial mar-
kets had been deregulated they were free to do so. Banks and foreign fi nancial 
institutions were ready to believe assurances of low risk because they assumed 
house prices would continue to rise indefi nitely (Bello 2008; Gupta 2008). 
However, rising house prices led to a building boom and an oversupply 
of housing, contributing to the bursting of the housing price bubble. Over-
supply was exacerbated when interest rates were increased and hundreds of 
thousands of people could no longer afford their mortgage payments and 
their houses came back onto the market (Gupta 2008). When this happened 
the owners of the MBSs and CDOs found that the houses were now worth 
much less than the mortgages they had bought and for companies like Leh-
man Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Bear Stearns, their 
consequent losses were more than they could afford and they were threatened 
with bankruptcy (Bello 2008). 
Other companies such as the American International Group (AIG) lost mo-
ney on credit default swaps – »derivatives that make it possible for investors 
to bet on the possibility that companies will default on repaying loans. Such 
bets on credit defaults now make up a $45 trillion market that is entirely un-
regulated.« (Bello 2008)
Financial institutions around the world were exposed to these CDOs and 
suffered major losses; some having to be bailed out by governments. The col-
lapse and near collapse of major fi nancial institutions led to a series of panics 
in stock markets around the world, wiping trillions of dollars off the value of 
stock. Falling share prices, combined with the unavailability of credit as banks 
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became more cautious, caused a decline in business and consumer confi dence 
as well as a slump in consumer demand and lowered economic growth, which 
have in turn fed rising levels of unemployment and recession. 
Response to the Crisis
The response of governments to this fi nancial crisis – bailing out banks and 
large fi nancial institutions and spending huge amounts to stimulate the eco-
nomy – seemed to herald the end of neoliberalism and a return to Keynsian 
policies. There was talk of the end of global capitalism and widespread criti-
cism of corporate greed. However, the only ideology that corporate leaders 
are consistently loyal to is corporate self-interest and neoliberalism is only 
useful as a tool for business-managing society when the economy is expan-
ding and corporate profi ts are increasing. In times of economic downturn, as 
the recent global fi nancial crisis has demonstrated, business leaders manage 
governments into supplying bailouts for companies and government spen-
ding for economic stimulus. Even so, the push for privatisation, deregulation 
and free trade and investment has not abated. 
The business community continues to press for a successful conclusion of 
the Doha Round. In April 2009 the G8 Business Leaders, a group representing 
business coalitions in G8 nations, declared the need for G8 governments to 
»strengthen and publicly renew their full commitment to an open global 
economy… The successful conclusion of the Doha Round lies at the very 
heart« of this commitment and would provide »the strongest possible stimu-
lus for the recovery of the global economy« (G8 Business Leaders 2009). G8 
government leaders have obediently confi rmed their commitment to open 
global trade.1
The UN Conference on the Financial and Economic Crisis, whilst recogni-
sing the »critical need for expanding the scope of regulation and supervision 
and making it more effective« nevertheless called for the »conclusion to the 
Doha Round that increases market access« (Quoted in vander Stichele 2009). 
The aim of the Doha Round is to further deregulate fi nancial services and re-
1 See for example, Joint Press Statement on ASEAN+3 Cooperation in Response to the 
Global Economic and Financial Crisis Bangkok, 3 June 2009, http://www.asean
sec.org/JPS-ASEAN+3-Cooperation-Financial-Crisis.pdf; Meeting of APEC Minis-
ters responsible for Trade, Singapore, 21-22 July, 2009, http://www.apec.org/me
dia/2009_mrt_statement.html.
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move limits on the size and activities of foreign fi nancial companies under Ge-
neral Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) rules (vander Stichele 2009). 
In his condemnation of »extreme capitalism«, Australian prime minister 
Kevin Rudd was careful to avoid criticism of free trade and globalisation (The 
Monthly 2009). And, despite the rhetoric about the need for tighter fi nancial 
regulation, the US and EU are still pushing for bilateral free trade agreements 
with developing nations that preclude regulation of foreign banks and the 
fi nancial sector. The UN Commission of Experts on the fi nancial crisis has 
admitted that: 
Many bilateral and multilateral trade agreements contain commitments that circum-
scribe the ability of countries to respond to the current crisis with appropriate regu-
latory, structural, and macro-economic reforms and rescue packages, and may have 
exposed them unnecessarily to the contagion from the failures elsewhere in the global 
economic system. (Quoted in vander Stichele 2009) 
The banking industry has fought against all efforts to impose controls on 
their business (Financial Times 2010). In Australia, the government has even 
created a government department to reduce regulation of business, The De-
partment of Finance and Deregulation. Cahill (Cahill 2009, 14) notes: »In 
most cases, states have acted to protect the viability of the system of capital 
accumulation rather than to shield ordinary citizens directly from the some-
times violent fl uctuations of the market.«
Even before the global fi nancial crisis Latin American nations were trying 
to break free from the Washington Consensus. Voters in Venezuela, Brazil, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and El Salvador elected leaders who 
opposed neoliberal policies imposed by the World Bank and the IMF and 
some sought loans from China and Venezuela. However breaking free of the 
Washington Consensus has not been easy and the global fi nancial crisis will 
ironically force more nations to take up conditional loans with the World 
Bank and the IMF. Despite some rhetoric to the contrary, these organizations 
have done little to change the neoliberal policy conditions accompanying 
their loans (Cavanagh/Broad 2009).
The apparent retreat from some neoliberal policies doesn’t signal a retre-
at of business from managing democracies in the interests of global capi-
tal. After all the business embrace of neoliberalism was one of convenience. 
Business leaders have no ideological commitment to neoliberalism and are 
willing to jettison those policies that do not currently suit the interests of 
global capitalism so that governments can intervene to shore up business con-
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fi dence, rescue large fi nancial institutions and stimulate economic growth. 
Nonetheless, business-friendly neoliberal policies, such as free global trade 
and investment, privatisation of public services, less progressive taxes and 
deregulation of most business activities, are being maintained in business-
managed democracies around the world. 
However, despite the unwillingness of global capital to loosen its grip on 
the policies of nations around the world, change may be forced in time be-
cause of a number of intractable problems that have not been solved. First-
ly the need for capital to expand is still faced with the problem of falling 
consumer demand resulting from growing inequality. This could feasibly be 
fi xed with higher wages and more progressive taxation systems but further 
expansion of production is constrained by global warming and other envi-
ronmental problems and the solutions to this are less likely to be solvable in a 
business-managed democracy.
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